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CHAPTER 13 
The Decisive Moment 
The Science of Decision Making 
under Stress 
Joseph W. Pfeifer and James L. Merlo 
I n January 2009, US Airways Flight 1549 performed an emergency land-ing in the Hudson River after hitting a flock of birds and losing thrust in 
all engines. Decisions made by the pilot not to return to the airport of the 
flight's origin or to attempt to land at surrounding airports, but instead to 
bring the aircraft down in the icy cold waters between New York City and New 
Jersey, saved all 155 people on board. A few years earlier, on September 11, 
2001, another plane had flown down the Hudson River, this time intentionally 
crashing into the North Tower of the World Trade Center. Seventeen minutes 
later, hijackers flew a second plane into the upper floors of the South Tower. 
On that fateful morning, there were two other deliberate plane crashes, one 
into the Pentagon and the other into a field in Pennsylvania. People around 
the world watched intently as firefighters and other emergency responders 
made critical decisions in their efforts to rescue some 20,000 people thought to 
have been in the towers that day. Subsequently, in Afghanistan and Iraq, mili-
tary commanders made life and death decisions on battlefields. Through the 
use of mass media, people around the world are often eyewitnesses in near 
real time to the decisive moment when leadership is on the line and critical 
decisions are made to adapt to the danger of extreme events. Those watching 
the decision makers have infinite time to second-guess after the fact, free of 
the stress and personal drama that surround these decisions. 
Many who operate and lead in dangerous contexts have stories of deci-
sive moments of exercising their leadership. The in extremis (dangerous) core of 
decision making, however, is one of the least studied elements of the human 
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dimension.1 The physical realities of professionals undertaking decisions in 
dangerous contexts, like firefighting and military operations, make this one of 
the most difficult environments for the application of science. Few research-
ers have endured the risk or unpredictability of studying human processes in 
the presence of danger, preferring instead less meaningful post hoc strategies. 
Nonetheless, understanding decision making in dynamic, complex situations 
where people's lives are at stake provides important insights into leadership in 
dangerous contexts. 
Part of decision making involves when to employ which method to 
increase the odds of succeeding when leading in a dangerous context. To 
demystify this process, decision-making research will be applied here to per-
sonal experiences while peering inside the World Trade Center on September 
11, visiting the battlefield, and going inside a cockpit during an emergency 
landing to see what it is like to make decisions when it counts the most. 
Examining the decisive moments for firefighters, soldiers, and airline pilots 
provides unique insight into how decisions are made under the stress and 
pressure of extreme events. Knowledge gained about decision making in dan-
gerous environments can be applied to a broad range of businesses, govern-
mental and nongovernmental services, or wherever leadership is expected to 
make critical decisions in a crisis. 
THE ELEMENTS OF COMMAND AND DECISION MAKING 
Extreme events require leaders to make critical decisions under a haze of 
uncertainty and perform complex organizational tasks, usually under tremen-
dous stress. These leaders are asked to act decisively, yet remain flexible to a 
changing threat environment. The actual unpacking of decision making is a 
monumental task because researchers define the term in different ways, such 
as in relation to strategic thinking, psychology, neuroscience, and so on. In the 
nineteenth century, the military strategist Carl von Oausewitz wrote that dur-
ing pre-battle evaluations, great commanders, such as Napoleon Bonaparte, 
saw how to win a battle in a" glance." Oausewitz uses the French expression 
coup d'oeil, which he describes as "the rapid discovery of a truth that to the 
ordinary mind is either not visible at all or only becomes so after long exami-
nation and reflection."2This "glance"is the moment during which command-
ers make sense of a situation and quickly envision a plausible course of action. 
Having this capability is the first element of command. 
The second element of command is having the resolve to carry through 
with one's strategic intuition despite surrounding uncertainty. A simple plan 
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vigorously executed in a timely manner is almost always better than a com-
plicated plan performed too late,3 The third element is having the "presence 
of mind" not to ignore uncertainty but to remain flexible to the unexpected, 
which may require analytical thinking. Clausewitz discovered that great com-
manders first see what needs to be done and then resolve to follow their 
insights while adapting to the unexpected. These three elements of command 
are also seen today during emergency and military operations. Examples of 
the three elements can be seen in the actions of firefighters in New York City 
following the al-Qaeda attacks of September 11. 
On September 11, 2001, at 8:46 a.m., while operating in the street at a gas 
emergency in Lower Manhattan, a group of firefighters heard the roar of 
a low-flying commercial airliner accelerating as it flew down the Hudson 
River. Suddenly, the plane appeared, then aimed and crashed into the 
North Tower of the World Trade Center. No one could believe that on a 
perfectly clear day, a plane would crash into New York's tallest building. In 
an instant we knew that we were going to the biggest fire of our lives. I 
remembered trying to comprehend what took place and at the same time 
take command. My first order was a direct command: "Go to the World 
Trade Center." This was followed by a brief description on fire dispatch 
radio that a plane has crashed into the World Trade Center and to trans-
mit a second alarm. Based on past experience at major fires, I knew I had to 
give concise orders to maintain command and control. These orders were 
given almost automatically; within seconds of impact and without fully 
understanding the magnitude of the event. Without hesitation, firefight-
ers immediately mounted their fire trucks. With flashing lights and blasting 
sirens, we raced to the World Trade Center. The fire and the smoke coming 
from the upper floors of the World Trade Center fit the pattem of a high-
rise building fire. But this was no routine fire. 
The World Trade Center attack was a novel and complex event. Never 
before had a commercial plane deliberately crashed into a modem sky-
scraper. It did not match anything from our firefighting experience and 
was quit different from the accounts of a much smaller military B-25 plane 
crashing into the Empire State Building on July 28,1945. As we responded 
to the World Trade Center, I remember telling myself that I had to slow 
my thoughts down and deliberately think of what I had to do next. There 
were tens of thousands of people that needed to be evacuated or rescued. I 
forced myself to remain calm. 
Within a minute of my first radio transmission, I gave additional orders 
very precisely and deliberately over the Manhattan fire dispatch radio: 
"Battalion One to Manhattan, we have a number of floors on fire. It looked 
like the plane was aiming for the building. Transmit a third alarm. Have the 
second alarm report to the North Tower and have the third alarm stage at 
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Vesey and West Street." This message began with an intuitive statement of 
the plane aiming for the building, denoting a terrorist attack, and an ana-
lytical order envisioning the initial resources needed and where to deploy 
these units. Over the next 100 minutes after this transmission, dramatic 
events of rescue and building collapse unfolded rapidly requiring critical 
decisions that combined intuition and analysis. 
In a crisis, leaders are expected to not only use intuitive, gut feelings but also 
to apply rational thinking when making critical decisions. Each mode of deci-
sion making uses different parts of the brain, with one mode outperforming 
the other depending on the task that needs to be accomplished. The key to 
good decision making in dangerous situations is knowing when to rely on 
which mode of thinking and when to use both. The battlefield is replete with 
examples of commanders constantly switching from one mode to another or 
sometimes applying a hybrid approach. For example, on April 5, 2003, less 
than two weeks after ground forces started moving north into the country of 
Iraq, U.S. military forces conducted raids through the center of the Iraqi cap-
ital, Baghdad. Three battalions, fewer than a thousand combat soldiers, had 
launched an aggressive thrust of Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles 
into the heart of the city, and in three days of bloody combat ended the initial 
phases of the Iraq War. The surprise assault on Baghdad, spearheaded by the 
Spartan Brigade commander, Colonel David Perkins, who led the 2nd Brigade 
of the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), is an illustration of one leader's 
intuition that a single armored brigade would be able to successfully penetrate 
and literally capture a city defended by one of the world's largest armies. 
Using a combination of intuition (I have sufficient combat strength to 
accomplish the mission) and analytical thinking (my logistics can support this 
initiative), Perkins declared on April 7,"If I can spend a night in Baghdad, then 
this war is over." Organized resistance by defenders of the regime of Saddam 
Hussein essentially ended after this commander's bold action. Thus, a decision 
by a commander on the ground potentially saved lives by ending the imme-
diate armed resistance. Some of the highest officers in the U.S. military com-
mand found out about Perkins' tactical exploitation of the enemy only after 
seeing media coverage of it. The operation exceeded their expectations. The 
critical combination of intuition and analytical thinking were paramount. The 
decisive moment in dangerous situations requires the ability to switch and 
combine the different modes of thinking.4 
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INTUITIVE THINKING VERSUS ANALYTICAL THINKING 
The most widely accepted rational model for decision making derives from the 
work of 1. 1. Janis and 1. Mann, who define decision making as a process of 
comparing a range of options, evaluating them, reexamining their positive and 
negative consequences, rating them, and then determining the best option.s 
The difficulty is that rational decision making has limited application in a dan-
gerous situation, where leaders are forced to act quickly and without compre-
hensive information. Rational decision making works well with simple events 
or even complicated ones when there is sufficient time to analyze and com-
pare the facts; this, however, is not how firefighters, soldiers, or pilots operate 
at the scene of complex or dangerous incidents, where fire or bullets are flying 
or a plane has no power. Those confronted with such situations depend heav-
ily upon their intuition in deciding what actions to take. Yet, analytical decision 
making is also called upon during emergencies to craft creative solutions for 
novel events. Problems might arise from a lack of guidance regarding when 
best to use intuition and when to switch to rational analysis. To fully compre-
hend decision making, one should examine research on it in the psychology 
and neuroscience literature. 
The psychologist Gary Klein has done extensive research on the decision 
making of firefighters and combat soldiers. Based on his analysis, they make 
decisions by using cues to recognize a situation as typical (or atypical) and to 
decide a course of action by relating it to their experience.6 Developing a quick 
course of action benefits from pattern matching and envisioning how actions 
will be carried out while also adapting to the evolving situation. This means 
that firefighters and soldiers do not compare all possible options, but choose 
the solution most likely to work based on prior experience.7These experiences 
are rooted in past events or training or are vicariously experienced through 
the study of after action reviews and history. If an option is not working, it is 
immediately customized or abandoned and a new solution created. This per-
mits firefighters and soldiers to adapt quickly and avoid being paralyzed by 
evaluating endless possibilities. These types of decisions are further defined by 
A. Dijksterhuis and 1. F. Nordgren as a gut feeling and by the popular writer 
Malcolm Gladwell as decisions that occur in"blink."8 Here, researchers believe 
that intuition, which is recognizing what to do without fully being conscious 
of why one has this knowledge, plays a critical role in decision making. 
To explain intuition, J. Lehrer explores the inner working of the brain. 
He argues that emotions that trigger intuitive insight occur when the neu-
ral transmitter dopamine is released. Dopamine automatically detects sub-
tle patterns based on experiences that are not consciously noticed.9 The more 
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experience and knowledge one has, the more likely a new incident will match 
a pattern from the past. Intuition or the emotional brain is especially useful in 
making immediate decisions in life-threatening situations. It is the supercom-
puter of the brain, rapidly scanning past experience to find relevant informa-
tion that matches the current condition.10 
Another example of high-stakes decision making with lives on the line 
occurred on January 15, 2009. After taking off from New York's LaGuardia 
Airport, US Airways Flight 1549 struck a flock of geese, which caused the 
plane to lose thrust in both engines. Captain Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger 
radioed a Mayday message, stating that the plane had lost power and was 
turning back toward LaGuardia. The air traffic controller suggested runway 13. 
Sullenberger "knew intuitively and quickly that the Hudson River might be 
[the] only option, and so articulated it." He responded to the controller, say-
ing,"We're unable; we may end up in the Hudson."ll Sullenberger next, how-
ever, considered Teterboro Airport, in nearby New Jersey. After being told by 
the air traffic controller that he was cleared for an emergency landing on run-
way 1, Sullenberger said,"We can't do it."Not wanting to believe the gravity of 
the situation, the air traffic controller again asked Sullenberger which runway 
he would like at Teterboro. Sullenberger immediately replied, "We're gonna be 
in the Hudson." 
Desperate to come up with another option, the air traffic controller sug-
gested Newark International Airport, which was a few miles away, but the 
decision was already made. Captain Sullenberger then narrowed his focus to 
concentrating on landing the aircraft in the icy Hudson. The airplane skidded 
along the surface of the water and turned slightly left before it came to a stop 
near the Intrepid Air and Sea Museum. Sullenberger, realizing that the air-
plane was in danger of sinking, opened the cockpit door and gave a single 
order: "Evacuate./I 
During three critical minutes of flight, Captain Sullenberger did not try 
to compare all of his options before determining the best choice, but instead 
considered one at a time that he thought might work. He later wrote that 
there was not enough time to calculate the plane's rate of decent. Instead, 
he created a"three-dimensional mental model" of the situation to determine 
if his choice could be executedY This type of decision making fits Klein's 
recognition-primed decision-making model. As each of Sullenberger's men-
tal simulations failed in his search for the likely option that might work, he 
came to realize the best option was the Hudson RiverY Making decisions in 
dangerous circumstances requires the intuitive brain to size up the situation 
and form the initial impulse about what to do.14 The analytical brain then can 
be used to process the mental simulations to see if the option will work. Pilots 
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often refer to the skill to think during a crisis as creating a "deliberate calm," 
which blends intuitive pattern matching with analytical thinking. Analytical 
thinking occurs in the prefrontal cortex of the brain. IS It is where calculations 
are computed, logical sequences processed, and rational thinking takes place, 
This part of the brain also can tum off impulses, which is what Sullenberger 
did when he decided not to act on his first thought-to return to LaGuardia-
but decided instead to land in the Hudson River. 
COMBINING INTUITION AND ANALYSIS TO MANAGE 
DANGEROUS SITUATIONS 
Intuition is good for matching patterns based on experience, but when some-
one encounters a novel problem that does not match his or her experience, 
and dopamine secretions fail to generate the desired neuronal connections, it 
is essential, Lehrer argues, to remain calm and analyze the situation to gener-
ate a flash of insight.16 
On September 11, 2001, even the smallest decision was the difference 
between life and death. As events rapidly evolved, it was essential that emer-
gency responders blend intuition with analytical thinking. Upon arriving at 
the World Trade Center, firefighters initiated rescue operations by evacuat-
ing people from the buildings and trying to rescue those trapped by the rag-
ing inferno. Firefighters carried heavy rescue equipment and self-contained 
breathing apparatus as they ascended the narrow stairs. Along the way they 
encouraged people not to stop to rest, but to keep moving down the stairs and 
to exit the buildings. Little did anyone know that the fires were weakening the 
structural integrity of each building, and time was running out. 
At 9:59 a.m., we heard a load roar and felt the building rumble. Unbeknown 
to us in the North Tower, this was the sound of the collapsing South Tower. 
In a fraction of a second, we knew something was seriously wrong and 
quickly moved a few meters from the lobby command post to a passage-
way leading up to a pedestrian walkway over six lanes of traffic on West 
Street. This gut feeling or intuition was generated not by knowledge of the 
collapsing South Towel~ but by matching the loud roar to the experience 
of similar sounds of structural collapse. Immediately we interpreted this 
sound as a dangerous condition to us in the lobby and looked for shelter. 
This took place within an instant, without any analysis or second thought. 
I knew we had to move quickly from where we were standing. Seconds 
later, we were covered with choking dust and complete darkness, making 
it difficult to breath and impOSSible to see the hand in front of your face . 
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Many firefighters, without consciously understanding what was taking 
place, made this intuitive decision, which saved them from being killed by 
flying debris. J. LeDoux proffers that intuition or gut feeling buys time while 
rational thought searches for a solution to a novel eventY In the example 
above, instead of spending time analyzing what was happening, the intuitive 
part of the firefighters'brains quickly processed information and came up with 
the idea to leave the lobby. Firefighters and soldiers often use this type of deci-
sion making in times of danger. Klein also suggests that intuition precedes 
analysis. IS People with expertise know what to look for when sampling envi-
ronmental stimuli. 1. Shattuck, J. Merlo, and J. Graham found that more expe-
rienced military leaders, based on time in service and rank, tend to ask for less 
information when making decisions than do officers with less experience.19 
Their study of military leaders' decision making, which they termed "cogni-
tive integration," suggests that experienced leaders' intuition allows them to 
sample a small number of sources, ignoring those they deem not worthy of 
consideration. Less-experienced officers sample all sources of information 
available and usually as much of each as allowed.20 
Switching from intuitive thought to rational analysis is even more difficult 
under dangerous and high-stress conditions. Immediately after the loud 
rumbling stopped Oater we learned the sound was from crashing steel 
and concrete), some of the Chiefs continued to use their intuition to issue 
orders that "we have to get out of here." Certainly, this was a good idea 
and a major concern when you do not know how to get out of the build-
ing. But this was a building that I was very familiar with and I had been 
to hundreds of times. Even in total darkness I had a good idea on how to 
get out. My experience and knowledge of the World Trade Center complex 
allowed me a few seconds to switch my thinking from intuition to analyze. 
Here I was able to focus on the next most important action to take, besides 
our own escape. It was clear that if we could no longer command from 
the lobby of the North Tower (Tower I), we had to withdraw the firefight-
ers from the building. I depressed the transmission button on my portable 
radio and gave the following firm order, "Command to all units in Tower I, 
evacuate the building."21 
While this may sound like an obvious decision for those watching broad-
casts of events on September 11, it was not that obvious for those at the World 
Trade Center who did not have the same information, that is, that the South 
Tower had collapsed. Those in command at the North Tower had to over-
come cognitive biases to continue rescue operations and instead to make a 
decision that had never been made in the history of the New York City Fire 
Department-abandon a burning building with hundreds of people still 
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trapped inside. The novelty of the 9/11 attacks did not allow the firefighters 
to match their experience to past patterns of commanding and follow stan-
dard procedures. Instead, it forced them to become creative in the decisions 
they made. A. Howitt and H. Leonard note that emergency responders need 
to improvise when confronted with novel events.22 Many of the people that 
were saved on September 11 owe their lives to improvisational thinking. 
Lehrer points out that emotions are adept at finding patterns based on 
experience, but when someone encounters an event never before experi-
enced, he or she needs to deliberately analyze the situation to devise inno-
vative solutions.23 On 9/11, instead of responding to the gut feeling to get out 
of the North Tower, the firefighters there concentrated on continuing to com-
mand. The prefrontal cortex is uniquely designed to manage emotions, fil-
ter out extraneous information, and search for creative solutions to complex 
problems. Switching from intuitive to analytical thinking allowed emergency 
responders to focus on commanding, which led to the flash of insight to evac-
uate firefighters from the North Tower. 
In immediately dangerous contexts, people act first and then try to make 
sense of the situation.24 In complex contexts, however, leadership involves 
probing first, making sense of the situation, and then responding.2s Leaders 
allow new patterns to emerge. The decision making in the North Tower of the 
World Trade Center is an example of this blending of intuition and cognition. 
Intuition gave the firefighters the extra seconds needed to conduct more ana-
lytical reasoning to adapt to the novelty of the situation. 
After giving the evacuation order and finding our way out, we stood under 
the north pedestrian bridge over West Street, connecting the World Trade 
Center to the World Financial Center. The street was covered with paper 
and the air filled with a brownish-gray dust. The Marriott hotel that was 
between the North and South Towers was heavily damaged and the inci-
dent command post, overseeing command of rescue operations in both 
towers, was abandoned. This critical situation with novel sensory infor-
mation made little sense. Even standing in the street, we never received 
word that a nO-story office building just collapsed nor could we see the 
collapsed South Tower because of the dust. I remember forcing myself to 
comprehend what possibly could have taken place. The more I tried to 
analyze the situation, the longer it took to make a decision on what to do 
next. Little did we know that the North Tower was about to collapse and 
crush the overpass we were standing underneath. My intuition could not 
match what I was seeing to any experience and my analysis failed to make 
sense of the scene. 
Then suddenly, I felt this cold chill running down my spine that this 
was a bad place to stand. Immediately, I acted quickly to lead the group 
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I was with out from under the pedestrian bridge and north to the comer 
of West and Vesey Streets. Key to this decision was the ability to have the 
presence of mind to switch between the two modes of thinking and not be 
paralyzed by too much analytical thinking. 
Adaptability in dangerous contexts requires the ability to oscillate between 
intuitive and analytical modes of thinking for decision making. 
BARRIERS TO DECISION MAKING 
Dangerous conditions demand that personnel who perform in such contexts 
prevail over physical, cognitive, and organizational limitations to carry out 
their mission. In extreme danger, these limitations become barriers for leaders 
to overcome in their decision making. 
Physical Limitations 
Warriors and emergency responders operate in conditions that can and do 
impose significant demands on the senses, limiting the ability to communi-
cate through normal auditory and visual pathways. Noise (e.g., vehicle engines, 
power tools and gushing water, weapons fire) and murky conditions (e.g., 
smoke, sandstorms) can hinder the ability to communicate critical informa-
tion. Under high stress, an attentional narrowing of the senses occurs that can, 
for example, reduce one's peripheral vision.26 This affects perception by the 
senses as outlined in the above example of the environmental factors present 
at ground zero. These physical challenges make it extremely difficult to scan, 
focus, make decisions, and act. Heat, cold, exhaustion, and a host of other 
stressors can have debilitating effects on the long-term and working memory.27 
Cognitive Limitations 
Many military strategists emphasize that the strength needed to win future 
wars will be more cognitively based than kinetically based.28 This assertion 
rings true for emergency responders as well. Early tactical decisions made in 
the handling of dangerous emergencies will have significant operational-level 
effects on outcome. In such situations,leaders will need to overcome their cog-
nitive biases to increase the quality of their decisions when lives are involved. 
Decision makers constantly try to make sense of context. M. Endsley 
points out that sensemaking is backward focused, finding reasons for past 
events, while situation awareness is typically forward looking, projecting what 
is likely to happen in order to inform effective decision-making processes.29 
Decision making relies on seeing what has happened and anticipating what 
Table 13.1 Common Decision Making and Behavioral Biases 
Automation bias 
Bandwagon effect 
Confirmation bias 
Professional 
deformation 
Denial 
Expectation bias 
Extreme aversion 
Framing effect 
Illusion of control 
Information bias 
Loss aversion 
Normalcy bias 
The tendency to trust information provided via electronic infor-
mation systems over intuition or humans; accepting information 
derived from the use of automation as a "best guess" instead of 
vigilant information seeking and processing 
The tendency to do (or believe) things because other people do, 
with the goal of gaining in popularity or being on the winning side 
The tendency to search for or interpret information in a way that 
confirms one's preconceptions or course of action. 
The tendency to look at things according to the conventions of 
one's profession, ignoring broader points of view 
The tendency to disbelieve or discount an unpleasant fact or 
situation 
The tendency to believe or certify results or analysis that agree 
with one's expectations of an outcome and to disbelieve, dis-
card, or downgrade corresponding weightings for information that 
appears to conflict with those expectations 
The tendency to avoid extremes, being more likely to choose an 
option if it is the intermediate choice 
The drawing of different conclusions based on how data are 
presented 
The tendency to believe that one can control or at least influence 
outcomes that one clearly cannot 
The tendency to seek information even w hen it cannot affect 
action 
The disutility of giving up an object is greater than the utility associ-
ated with acquiring it 
The tendency to discount novelty and to respond to such events 
with only routine procedures 
Neglect of probability The tendency to completely disregard probability when making a 
decision under uncertainty 
Not invented here 
I'" 
Reactance 
L . 
The tendency to ignore that a product or solution already exists 
because its source is seen as an adversary 
The urge to do the opposite of what someone wants one to do out 
of a need to resist a perceived attempt to constrain one's freedom 
of choice 
Selective perception The tendency for expectations to affect perception 
Unit bias 
Wishful thinking 
Zero-risk bias 
The tendency to want to finish a given unit of a task or an item 
often resulting in sequential behavior limiting simultaneous tasks 
The formation of beliefs and making decisions according to what 
might be pleasing to imagine instead of by appealing to evidence 
or rationality 
.............................................................................................................. 
Preference for reducing a small risk to zero instead of a greater 
reduction in a larger risk 
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might happen. So, how does an expert process information? Along with 
understanding context and noticing information, cues, and data in the envi-
ronment' or the lack of certain cues, an expert often also has the ability to tune 
out unnecessary information. Sometimes leaders can successfully employ 
cognitive shortcuts by utilizing heuristics, or rules of thumb. These tactics and 
techniques, however, cannot alone be relied upon. 
Instructing leaders on the dangers and benefits of types of cognitive 
shortcuts or strategies that are used consciously and unconsciously will poten-
tially make a better decision maker, or at least a more informed one, especially 
under extreme conditions, when physical and cognitive resources are poten-
tially at their limits. The benefits of shortcuts for decision making are self-
evident, for example, deciding which exit of a plane one would choose in an 
emergency or formulating an escape route when searching an apartment on 
fire . The pitfalls of certain heuristics and biases are, however, well known, from 
the framing of decisions to the readiness to use what is available to the mem-
0ry' or the availability heuristic. 3D 
Cognitive biases are essentially mental errors caused by simplified 
information-processing strategies. It is important to distinguish cognitive bias 
from other forms of bias, such as cultural bias, organizational bias, or bias that 
results from one's own self-interest. In other words, a cognitive bias is not nec-
essarily the result of an emotional or intellectual predisposition toward a cer-
tain judgment, but rather of subconscious mental procedures for processing 
information.31 One of the ways to avoid the pitfalls and shortcomings asso-
ciated with cognitive heuristics and biases is to be aware of them and to use 
simulations to practice overcoming them. Table 1 lists some common decision-
making and behavioral biases of which all decision makers should be aware. 
Organizational Limitations 
While cognitive bias may blind individuals to emerging threats, organiza-
tional factors may prevent the integration of information until it is too late.32 
As events move from routine to complex, emergency responders and mem-
bers of the military tend to "segregate" functional tasks. What was once a con-
venient division of labor mutates into specialized fiefdoms, with little contact 
or communication between people performing one task and those performing 
another.33 This separation creates organizational blind spots in decision mak-
ing. There is a natural tendency for people with similar backgrounds to form 
homogeneous groups and provide more information to members of their own 
group and less to members outside the group. The organizational behavior of 
separating and providing information only within a certain group is known 
as organizational bias. 34 In some businesses, such behavior is necessary for 
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maintaining a competitive advantage over the competition. In dangerous con-
texts, however, such behavior potentially limits situational awareness, which 
creates barriers for decision making and commanding. 
The propensity of similar individuals to migrate to each other is called 
homophily.35 Evidence has been found that as the stress and complexity of a 
crisis increase, people tend to narrow their focus on aspects they judge to be 
most important to them.36 In extreme danger, they often feel little obligation to 
share valuable information with those outside their group, since responsibil-
ity for acting is diffused across the in-group. In most cases, people think that 
someone else in their organization will share the information. In social psy-
chology this concept is referred to as a diffusion of responsibility and is what 
often leads to the well-known bystander effect. 
NOVELTY AND COMPLEXITY POINTS TO INTERDEPENDENCE 
Fire chiefs, military commanders, and airline pilots dominate the examples 
cited here, but most professionals who regularly operate in dangerous con-
texts have the authority and often the experience to deal with critical situa-
tions-until perhaps they are faced with novel and complex events. These 
events by their very nature are characterized as having interagency dependen-
cies for collaborative intelligence, requiring decisive leadership to overcome 
cognitive and organizational biases. A failure to address biases will result in 
a lack of situational awareness and poor decision making, which places lead-
ers and managers at a disadvantage in handling crises. During complex and 
novel events, incident management does not rest with a single person; rather, 
leaders should increase the rate of information exchange and foster collabo-
ration to generate new tactics and ideas. The key issue for decision makers is 
often not the ability to acquire more knowledge, but the ability to harness the 
knowledge of others. 
On May I, 2010, emergency responders had to overcome cognitive and 
organizational biases when they were called to a possible vehicle fire in New 
York's Tunes Square. When firefighters arrived, they noticed that something 
"did not seem right."The owner of the SUV was nowhere to be found, and 
there was white smoke coming from the car rather than black smoke. A hand-
held thermal camera showed no sign of fire, and an odor of fireworks ema-
nated from the rear of the vehicle. Firefighters exchanged this information with 
police and asked them to run the license plates. The plates did not match the 
car. The fire lieutenant had to quickly process all these pieces of information. 
It would have been easy for the lieutenant to have fallen victim to a num-
ber of cognitive biases and treat the incident as a routine car fire. Instead, he 
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concluded that they had a car bomb on their hands. He avoided organiza-
tional bias by collaborating with police throughout the process, which led to a 
decision to evacuate people from the area. Combining intuition with analysis 
and overcoming biases to recognize interdependencies of information were 
critical for safety. It was later determined that the SUV had the potential to be 
a lethal bomb. 
IMPROVING DECISION MAKING 
An ongoing effort exists to find technological answers to address the physical 
dangers, cognitive puzzles, and organizational challenges that push leaders to 
their limits. The New York City Fire Department has developed an electronic 
command board (ECB) system to assist chiefs in decision making at fires and 
emergencies. ECBs are touch-screen computers for a network that displays 
such information as unit deployment, emergency distress signals, and digital 
blueprints of floors and other building information. Large (32-inch) ECB dis-
plays are used for major fires, but there are also smaller (IO-inch) tablets, both 
of which graphically present essential information for decision making. As an 
incident increases in complexity, incident commanders are forced to remem-
ber dozens of unit names and locations within a building, while still manag-
ing the fire (or fires). Trying to manage too much information can overload the 
brain's working memory, adding to the stress of command and limiting one's 
ability to concentrate on critical aspects of incident management. The ECB 
frees the brain from memorizing facts by displaying them in easy-to-grasp 
pictures. This prevents chiefs from being overwhelmed by information occu-
pying valuable cognitive space, and instead to concentrate on managing the 
incident, which requires the brain to blend intuitive and analytical decisions. 
ECB is part of a wireless decision-support system that can share informa-
tion with other first responders at the scene and emergency operation cen-
ters elsewhere, thus creating a common operational picture and collaborative 
decision -making environment. 
The military strategist Clausewitz states that war is influenced primarily 
by human beings rather than technology or bureaucracy, although technology 
advancements indeed change the tactics, techniques, and procedures used. 
Exercising leadership in dangerous contexts is not only about individual deci-
sions, but also about getting others to adapt to a new threat environment. In 
extreme events, such as those terrorist attacks, military conflicts, and aviation 
emergencies, decision making is an interdependent activity, requiring collab-
orative intelligence. The challenge is to design a response system able to sup-
port and adjust readily to the urgent demands of events. 
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Providing decision makers with access to information from within and 
outside their agencies that normally would not be available can now be done 
through networks. Such networks have the emergent property of the whole 
being greater than the sum of its part because of the interaction and inter-
connection of their members.37 This fact was acknowledged through the 
Goldwater Nicholas Act of 1986 and by the 9/11 Commission by requiring and 
reiterating that military and emergency responders must operate together in a 
unified system to be as effective as possible. 
Initiatives are under way to develop means to allow military and emer-
gency responders to accumulate life experiences through the use of virtual 
simulations. These simulations should be designed to adapt and respond to 
decision makers in an intelligent manner and portray cognitively, culturally, 
and intellectually accurate and challenging scenarios focused on identifying, 
developing, improving, and assessing intuitive and analytical decision-making 
skills. The development of such simulators will provide leaders with the 
chance to learn and train through scenarios that replicate life experiences, rep-
etitiously and with low overhead and little risk. 
Human factors- the cognitive, cultural, and intellectual aspects of con-
flict-are proving increasingly to be the vital elements determining success 
on the battlefield. It is the proper application of technology to aid the human, 
that is, engineered with the human in mind, that will leverage human capa-
bilities and enhance human performance. For example, a well-designed inter-
face that elicits personal interaction could lead to a self-referent memory 
approach by a trainee, potentially improving accurate recall when a similar sit-
uation arises.38 This type of interaction with a simulator supports the theory of 
recognition-primed decision-making.39 If properly exploited through inter-
faces it could promote perceptual learning in the areas of intentional weight-
ing, stimulus imprinting, differentiation, and unitization.40 These facets of 
cognitive psychology and learning are addressed in flight simulators, while 
military and law enforcement organizations try to do the same with firearm 
and gunnery simulators and fire departments with high-rise building fire and 
flashover simulators. 
While a positive transfer of training is expected from virtual experiences, 
a host of other benefits can be realized with a well-made decision trainer. 
One can build crisis decision-making proficiencies-the deliberate practic-
ing of skills-using dynamic scenarios for use on tabletops as well as devis-
ing full-scale exercises that promote intuitive and analytical decision making 
under stress, teaching leaders to blend reason with emotions. These simula-
tors could be used to assist the development of individual and collaborative 
decision making. 
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Instructional methods for developing expertise must couple new tech-
nologies with seasoned experts, allowing simulations to compress experience 
into efficient repetition. The simulations should challenge trainees to adapt to 
novelty as well as act reflexively based on a strong grounding from what has 
happened in the past. Because time will not stop, and junior leaders require 
skills immediately upon entering high-risk occupations, it is necessary to 
accelerate the development of expertise by forming a cognitive apprenticeship 
with leaders recognized as being successful. Effective instructional methods 
provide mental schemas, allowing the organization of learning so leaders can 
match solutions to past or ongoing problems and create innovative courses 
of action for tomorrow's new problems. This type of approach should aim to 
improve long-term memory for ready recall in dealing with future extreme sit-
uations. Training needs to support guided discovery using the experiences of 
veteran leaders and include leaming from errors through naturalistic feedback. 
Leaders must be given time to reflect individually as well as collaboratively 
with peers and coaches on how to use the two modes of decision making to 
adapt to threat environments or crises. 
LEADERSHIP IMPLICATIONS 
Extreme events require leaders to place people in dangerous situations to cort-
tain and mitigate hazard. Using their understanding of decision making and 
behavioral biases, and with the help of simulations and repetitive training, 
successful leaders employ a blend of intuition and analytical decision mak-
ing. Although technology continues to influence decision makers at all levels, 
tactics, techniques, and procedures only change as a direct result of the cou-
pling of humans with the technology. The skillful integration of human and 
machine results in improved performance, which in the end can save lives. 
In stressful situations, leaders overcome ever-changing physical, cogni-
tive, and organizational environments to make critical decisions by produc-
ing a deliberate calm. The professionals who make leadership decisions under 
such extreme conditions exhibit remarkable fortitude and resilience. Those 
who operate in dangerous conditions have chosen a lifestyle that embraces 
challenges. They not only aim to survive harsh environments, but they thrive 
in them as well. Effective decision making under stress requires a balance 
between cognitive intuition and analysis. The stirring stories of 9/11, military 
battles in Iraq, and the emergency landing in the Hudson River illustrate the 
need to be armed with the knowledge of human cognitive capabilities and the 
understanding of strengths and weaknesses of the modes of decision making. 
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Decision making in a crisis becomes more difficult with increased complexity 
and the need for rapid solutions. Not only will firefighters, military, and pilots 
face decisive moments in their careers, executives will also find themselves 
making critical leadership decisions in business. Supplementing the individual 
decision making skills discussed in this chapter, collaborative decision mak-
ing is the next inescapable leadership challenge and thus necessitates further 
research. 
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